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Abstract. The culture of a company is often cited as the basis for how well that company performs both economically and 
environmentally. This can also lead to the development and adoption of generic management approaches that fail to 
adequately acknowledge the existence of multiple cultures within the organization or the potential disjuncture between 
how performance is perceived by personnel and any attempts to measure that performance in an ‘objective’ manner.  This 
failure to respond to the complexity of multiple cultures and perceived performance and the instigation of over-arching 
management systems can discourage constructive dissent and hinder the related capacity for innovation and improvement. 
This paper draws upon research into the level of congruence between perceived and objective measures of environmental 
performance in thirteen factories from the heavy industrial sector in China and Eastern Europe.  It presents findings that 
suggest managerial interactions, both laterally and vertically, are mediated by socio-cultural networks within and between 
family, community and workplace, resulting in a high level of unbounded complexity that influences the alignment 
between perceived and objective environmental realities. 
Keywords: complexity, culture, realities, language, hierarchy. 
 
1. Introduction 
Hodge and Coronado (2007) identify a paradox in the 
language of business and organizational science. On the 
one hand there is enthusiastic discourse about the value of 
continuous change and the opportunity that this offers for 
those who can live with the chaos; elsewhere there is a 
pressure to ensure stability and the orderly management 
of change.  Central to this paradox are the existence of 
multiple cultures within an organization (Mars 1994), 
compromising any attempts to generate a homogeneous 
identity and set of working practices, and creating a cor-
responding disjuncture between perceived and objective 
performance (Craig and Lemon 2008). This paper will 
explore the complexity that emerges from these phenom-
ena as they are manifest through the environmental per-
formance of thirteen Chinese and Eastern European 
factories engaged in the heavy industrial sector.   
The paper does not follow a traditional structure 
with data and analysis following a summary of the key 
literatures.  Rather, and in keeping with the complexity of 
the research findings to which it refers, the paper will 
introduce relevant explanatory literature as the findings 
from the case studies emerge. This is consistent with the 
need to combine inductive and deductive scientific ap-
proaches within an integrative methodology that reflects 
the need to explore both the perceptual evaluation of 
environmental performance and that which can be empi-
rically measured in accordance with various objective 
benchmarks e.g. ISO 14001. The paper will commence 
with the background to the research and an explanation of 
the methodology employed, initially in Poland and 
subsequently in China and Lithuania. The case study 
factories will then be described and a summary of the 
attributes of factory based complexity presented before a 
more detailed discussion of the key findings that help to 
explain that complexity and the resultant disparity 
between the objective and perceived reality of environ-
mental performance.  
 
2. Methodology and background to the study  
Initial research was undertaken in five Polish factories 
1998 and was grounded in the hypothesis that, following 
1993 and the collapse of the communist regime; educa-
tional resources concerning the environment would be 
limited leading to a lack of control over environmental 
degradation. This hypothesis proved to be an illusion.  It 
was found that whereas sufficient knowledge was avail-
able from the universities a complex array of organiza-
tional phenomena in the factories constrained the 
introduction and dissemination of environmental knowl-
edge. Such that poor decisions were being made in the 
context of a myriad of incoherent personal realities within 
a fear-bounded authoritarian management culture (Craig 
& Lemon 2004). 
A second phase of action-centered research com-
menced in 2001 (Craig & Lemon 2005); this encompas-
sed an additional seven factories in China and one in 
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ries in a comparison of Soviet dominated bureaucracies) 
in order to both delve deeper into the phenomena identi-
fied in the earlier research and to determine any differen-
ces between national and management cultures. This 
research identified further influential phenomena, inclu-
ding those related to gender, age and position in the ma-
nagement hierarchy, but mainly to the differences 
between benchmarked (empirical) and imaginary (percep-
tual) realities (Hume 1739; Noonan 1999) in heavy in-
dustrial production and environmental degradation.  
The case study factories were large, on sites of up to 
fifty hectares, and within a single heavy, electrical engi-
neering industrial sector. In China they were built with up 
to five stories but the total floor area of each was still less 
than those in Lithuania and Poland which occupied large-
ly single storey buildings. In China the seven study facto-
ries were located in various regions, Dong Guan 
Province, Shanghai Region and Hong Kong. As the facto-
ries were often a long way from their home towns, the 
general workforce in China tended to be housed in facto-
ry dormitories and it was also usual for the managers to 
live in single rooms in management dormitories at the 
factory site. The top manager on each site was always 
foreign Chinese, from countries such as Singapore, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, and with Western capitalist 
management experience. The lower levels of manage-
ment were nearly always mainland Chinese with a mana-
gement culture drawn from the communist era and based 
on the Confucian bureaucratic ethos (Fernandez 2004; 
Tsui et al. 2004). 
The five Polish factories were located across the 
country; all were close to large towns and employed a 
predominantly local workforce. Some of the more senior 
managers, who were moved frequently between factories 
in the same group of companies, lived in rented accom-
modation near the factory while maintaining their homes 
in distant locations. The top manager on each site was 
always Polish and with little or no training in, or 
knowledge of, Western management techniques. As with 
China, there was substantial bureaucracy, a command and 
control ethos and a fear and punishment culture. The 
single Lithuanian factory surveyed served as a control 
against the Polish factories. Both countries were ruled 
according to Russian dictat for some fifty years and the 
organizational bureaucracies should match in any compa-
rison. Any differences would highlight different socio-
cultural mechanisms in play. 
The workforce levels in Poland and Lithuania were 
mostly higher, but so was the range of products; in paral-
lel with this the Polish workforce was better trained and 
did sometimes, despite hierarchical restraints, use initiati-
ve. This difference extended to the environment although 
both sets of factories tended to be content with staying 
below the legal limits (e.g. for groundwater and chemical 
control) rather than improving; in particular there remain 
serious risks of large scale environmental outrages due to 
the storage methods for, and handling of, toxic oils and 
chemicals. 
The factories in both China and Eastern Europe were 
subject to significant change; China with rapid growth 
leading to stress in managerial ranks and Poland with a 
massive workforce reduction in order to cut costs and 
compete on price with EU companies. This also caused 
considerable stress on managers as it involved high levels 
of redundancy. The triangulated methodology adopted for 
the study consisted of four parts with each data stream 
providing a check on the others: 
− reality benchmarks (rbm’s) were derived by an 
environmental expert derived from detailed expert 
observations of factory impacts on the environ-
ment; the environment and production processes; 
− a strength of feeling (SOF) questionnaire was ad-
ministered to over two hundred managers in order 
to elicit how aspects of environmental perform-
ance were perceived; 
− semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
the senior manager at each of the thirteen factories; 
− informal discussions were undertaken with other 
managers and analyzed alongside the data derived 
from workshops that were organized in each fac-
tory to discuss the interim research results and ob-
tain feedback from management and supervisory 
staff. 
The purpose of the overall methodology (see Craig 
& Lemon 2008) was to determine the socio-cultural 
group patterning within each factory; this would provide 
a comparative framework for understanding the dynamics 
leading to knowledge transfer and environmental decision 
making (Merton 1967; Frost 1991; Zey 2001).  A prime 
factor in these dynamics was the gaps between the practi-
cal truth of production and related environmental im-
pacts, as determined by the expert derived benchmarks, 
and the perceptions of the managers about those impacts 
and how they defined environmental performance.  
 
3. Mapping factory interactions and network 
complexity 
3.1. An ideational framework 
It is proposed by Merton (1967) and Archer (1996) that 
ideas cannot be subject to mutation in the sense that, if 
there is a logically coherent culture (LCC) which is logi-
cal, generated from top management and homogeneous, 
throughout a company, then there will be no elision of, or 
addition to, that cultural idea, as logic is immutable.  This 
proposal is convenient for research use in the manage-
ment cultures which are of the iron cage variety (Weber 
1904), i.e. strongly hierarchical; however the uncertainty 
that arises with the existence of multiple (sub-) cultures 
within an organization, and the associated perceptions, 
mean that management according to logical coherence 
can be problematic.  
There are also linguistic problems which cause mu-
tations of understanding (Glen et al. 2003; Holmes 2001; 
Cobley 2001) as every individual has his or her own 
lexicon and puts a tacit interpretation on any communica-
tions from above or below in the management ranks (see 
also Lubit 2001).  This can be compounded in the middle 















Fig. 1. Mapping of some of the interactive variables (taken from the research data) 
 
re-interpret any communication to suit both the person 
above and the person below in order to maintain a non-
contentious working relationship with both. The socio-
cultural situation becomes more complex when there is 
no communication from senior management beyond the 
transmission of orders; however it is possible under cer-
tain ‘sub’-cultural conditions that interpretations of the 
order can be malleable so as to create space (Mars 1994) 
for that middle manager. 
 
3.2. Organization dynamics and process 
In Fig. 1, some of the complexities of interaction between 
managers and the workforce, derived from the case studies, 
are mapped together with those between levels of man-
agement and some of the environmental impacts resulting 
from the factory operations which management should be 
monitoring and controlling. One important aspect of this 
interaction is the dominance of production which is per-
ceived by many managers as the most important facet of 
operations – profit depends on output is the unsung mantra. 
Hence, the environmental requirements of certification to 
ISO14001, or an acceptance of the need not to degrade the 
environment, are mediated by not prejudicing production 
on account of environmental remediation.  
On the left-hand side of Fig. 1 there are the interac-
tions between the managers and the operatives which are 
affected by organizational hierarchies, the language of 
communication (Holmes 2001; Ramsey 2004), the lack of 
an overriding management mission or culture (Archer 
1996) which could mediate that language and individual 
realities (perceptions) which might or might not affect the 
communication and subsequent action.   
Towards the bottom of the figure are the main as-
pects that affect the factory and inform internal culture, 
the national culture, the management hierarchies and job 
boundaries and the business rules which reinforce the 
dominance of production. To the right-hand side of the 
figure are the topics which affect the expertise of indivi-
duals in the organization, the communication ethos, the 
communicated (explicit) knowledge and training and the 
ambiguity of the demands of certification to ISO14001. 
At the top of the figure, and towards the right, there 
are some of the primary elements of environmental deg-
radation which were subject to the generation of percep-
tions largely independent of empirical evidence on the 
ground (Craig and Lemon 2004, 2005). 
Table 1 summarizes the most important variables 
and grades the strength of their relationship based on over 
two hundred interviews with managers at all levels from 
board directors to supervisors. The perceived and empiri-
cal realities were taken from the survey data broken down 
by each management level and the extent of the gap 
between the two is taken as an indicator of the level of 
impact on decisions. 
As an example, the absence of a logically coherent 
culture was shown, in the research, to have little effect (L) 
in relation to social class which, in the countries concer-
ned, was taken as professional, technically or commercial 
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Table 1. Strength of relationship between researched variables (H – high; M – medium; L – low; N – no effect) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 no LCC  L H H H H H H 
2 social class L  H N M H H M 
3 language H H  H H H M M 
4 empirical reality H H H  L H H L 
5 perceived reality H H H L  H H H 
6 mgt hierarchy H H H L L  H M 
7 decisions H M M L H H H M 
8 job boundaries H M N M L H  N 
9 core peer groups H L L N H L L  
 
the language used at management interfaces between 
people with different social backgrounds, was exhibited 
as giving a high (H) level of misunderstanding or in-
comprehension. The grades are subjective, but based on 
an interpretation of the survey results, interviews with 
managers and observation of communication between 
managers at different levels. The paper will now explore 
some of these interactions in more detail. 
 
4. Some complex effects of social class and language in 
the factories 
The administered survey across managerial levels in each 
factory indicated more fragmentation (Frost et al. 1991), 
i.e. different Strength of Feeling scores at different levels 
in a company relating to the same topic at lower levels of 
the management chain, One explanation for this may be 
the vagueness and ambiguity of language which will be 
dependent on education and social class and which will 
determine the translation of physical events into percei-
ved impact (Shenghua 2008). The effect of the fragmen-
tation is summarized in the table at the foot of Figs 2.   
Although there are more people in the lower mana-
gement ranks, the ordinate is normalized (relative abun-
dance) so the charts can be compared directly. 
Translation of physical events into perceived impact 
(Shenghua 2008). The effect of the fragmentation is su-
mmarized in the table at the foot of Fig. 2. Although there 
are more people in the lower management ranks, the or-
dinate is normalized (relative abundance) so the charts 
can be compared directly. Further, the data indicated that: 
− In China, the sub-ordinate performs a task accord-
ing to their understanding of what they are told; 
− In Poland, the sub-ordinate massages any commu-
nication into a form congruent with their in-built 
or peer culture. 
Both of these observations were subsequently su-
pported in discussions with plant managers. 
For the purpose of this analysis, socio-cultural grou-
pings are defined as comprising those people with like 
perceptions whereas social class, on the other hand, is 
broadly dependent upon education and relative wealth. 
From the research data it was determined that the lower 
down the management chain the lower the social class 
and the more fragmented the perceptions at a given ma-
nagement level (see Fig. 2 in particular for Poland). Ca-
meron and Quinn (1999) propose that individual 
organizations, departments, product groups, and hierar-
chical levels may all have unique sub-cultures which for 
any topic, may change materially and temporarily, produ-
cing further complex interactions, themselves compoun-
ded by social class. 
Any research into cultural dynamics as a tool for 
analyzing types of dysfunction in organizations must also 
include, even if they are covert, issues of relative domi-
nance. Archer (1996) parades the ideas of dominant ideo-
logies as being primarily about the ruling class (e.g. 
business owners or top managers) but the argument can 
also be taken to facilitate analysis at lower levels such as 
operatives (social agency) wherein the assent of the so-






Fig. 2. Numbers of the fragmentation of perceptions down 
the management chain 
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1690, 1764) is required before dominance is exerted. 
Examples of where this does not happen are given in 
Mars (1994). Moreover, additional baggage taken into the 
work environment will include a language dependent 
upon social class and schooling, for instance, Durkheim 
(in Alexander 1988) avers that language codes indicate 
clues to social class, with the middle class having a more 
abstract language content and a more cosmopolitan out-
look in an organic solidarity, whereas the working class 
tends to have different control life-interests (Dubin 
1962).  One interesting example of this phenomenon was 
observed in a Chinese factory where the senior manager 
was trying to understand why a lower middle manager 
was not obeying an instruction, issued face to face, to 
take some specific actions in relation to the environ-




When coming into an organization, younger people 
will be beginning to move from under the dominance of 
the parental home and into the dominance of the industrial 
home (Nobbs et al. 1980), which will reinforce some pe-
rceptions, destroy others and imbue some new cultural 
precepts (see also Rose 1962). Hence, survey questions 
may elicit answers from this group which may be given 
from a set of person-centric perceptions which are in va-




5.1. Language, meaning and organizational  
communication 
The complexity of intra-organizational communication 
has been extensively addressed (Shenghua 2008; Glen et 
al. 2003; Alvesson 2002; Holmes 2001; Cameron & 
Quinn 1999; Alaasutari 1993; Zey 1992; Wierzbicka 
1991; Badcock 1991; Faludi 1987; Brehmer 1986; Bellah 
1973; Rose 1962).  
Rose (1962) proposes that human beings use sym-
bols such as language to stimulate action on the part of 
others; symbols have a learned meaning and value for 
those others. However, the learned meanings are not ne-
cessarily identical between managers, but rather depend 
on individual and complex perceptions of these mea-
nings. These meanings are therefore themselves suscep-
tible to error, ambiguity and complexity. 
For the executive managers within the case study 
factories a fundamental challenge was to identify and 
implement the appropriate language for communicating 
organizational instructions across ‘sub’ cultural bounda-
ries. Bellah (1973) argues that we all use the same words 
without giving them the same meaning; while Wierzbicka 
(1991) states that people remain in certain cultures, gui-
ded by certain principles which are not always shared 
more widely. She goes on to propose that in order to ob-
tain human understanding (of meaning) it is necessary to 
find terms which belong to both parties in an interaction.  
In the context of organizational cultures, Cameron and 
Quinn (1999) suggest that these are reflected by: 
 
…. what is valued, the dominant leadership styles, the 
language and symbols, the procedures and routines, and the 
definitions of success which make an organization unique… 
 
Further, Glen et al. (2003), looking at social interac-
tion, find that ‘relationships are constructed and negotia-
ted moment by moment in a ‘delicate to and fro’, hence 
the problems of meaning in language are compounded by 
personal relationships. This is a phenomenon noted by 
Badcock (1991): 
 
Language increases the possibilities for deception and 
self-deception.  If language permits much more detailed and 
extensive information, it also permits and encourages the com-
munication of detailed mis-information.   
 
In the discussions and survey for this research it was 
evident that some half-truths and massaged truths were 
promulgated, sometimes to generate the space mentioned 
by Mars (1994) and sometimes to obfuscate mistakes in 
decision-taking and outcomes. Likewise Benveniste 
(1981) proposes that people will formulate strategies to 
counter management practices which are perceived as 
threats, whereas management will pursue opposite strate-
gies to seek to control of these practices, thereby com-
pounding (system) errors by not understanding the real 
and complex socio-cultural dynamics.  
Overall, language and meaning are seen as playing a 
very significant part in organizational dynamics and inc-
reasing complexity, exacerbated with what Shenghua 
(2008) sees as vagueness and ambiguity and, to a large 
extent, this dimension is made even more complex by 
person-centric realities related to job roles. These realities 
will affect and alter any communications and actions. 
 
 
Case note 2:  General 
The job of environmental managers in the Chinese factories 
was given to the quality managers who were young women 
with little factory experience and exhibited little knowledge 
of the formal and informal practices in production technolo-
gies, nor of the language of the organizations and the envi-
ronment. 
 
In the Polish and Lithuanian factories, three had young 
women in this position and three had mature women in 
charge, these latter having both factory experience and a 
better understanding of ‘factory language’ and the environ-
ment. 
 
The research indicated that the transition from leaving 
school and progressing to a mature understanding of factory 
and language practice takes time and requires an adjustment 
of language to meet the social mores of the organization 
Case note 1:  Factory S in China 
The conversation between them lasted some forty minutes 
but it became obvious that they did not understand each 
other and the discussion was ended without a solution – 
they both had individual language and realities (see also 
Glen et al. 2003). The top manager was a Singaporean, 
trained in Australia in Western management ways and 
language, while the middle manager was mainland Chinese 
with little or no knowledge of that type of imagery, langu-
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5.2. Socio-cultural complexities in communication 
If perceptual realities create an imaginary culture which 
is causing real effects, then it becomes an empirical real-
ity with empirical effects. An example of one of these 




This applies also to socio-cultural groups where 
imagery may be driven by both imagined and real 
contexts; hence perceptions can be related to beliefs and 
culture even if these perceptions are based on imaginary 
contexts, or to a different interpretation of a physical fact 




The case note company had a set of fragmented pe-
rceptions and a culture characterized by a lack of 
knowledge sharing from the top management. There was 
a socially constructed antithesis to a logical culture, and 
an example of what Zey (1992) proposes, in that informa-
tion can be socially constructed, and individually and 
differentially interpreted.   
Since information is being represented within a 
world comprised of linguistic interpretations and percep-
tions, the proposals of Alasuutari (1995) also apply in 
that reality is also socially constructed. Holmes (2001) 
cites Bernstein on the lines that people with constricted 
language ability will also find difficulties in cognition.  
Hence, any communication needs to be in a form of lan-
guage which will seek to touch the right triggers in an 
individual’s conceptual and perceptual abilities (see Mor-
gan 1989, 1998, and Paton 1996) on mental models, and 
Senge (1992) on entrenched mental models related to 
people’s personal realities).   
 
6. The complexity of empirical and perceived realities 
In most cases in the survey, examination of the data dem-
onstrates that empirical and perceptual reality, concerning 
environmental and related aspects of production, do not 
correspond and can be considered as largely independent 
of each other. Moreover, the perceptual realities, as repre-
sented by the perceived strength of feeling scores derived 
from management questionnaires were also often not 
aligned. This lack of coherence extends to and between 
the factories themselves, with relatively few matching 
perception patterns representing context-dependent im-
agery in the minds of the managers and thereby multiple 
realities. 
The survey data showed that, for eighteen out of the 
twenty question topics on production and the environ-
ment, the perceptions within and between each individual 
factory were very different and significantly fragmented. 
These gaps between empirical and perceptual realities, 
and the further gaps of understanding in communication 
between managers, are themselves complex and 
exacerbated by the avoidance of risk in the decision pro-
cesses (case note 4). 
Values, knowledge and motivation, among other 
things, can affect how and why decisions are taken. As 
Brehmer et al. (1986) notes, motivational tendencies are 
temporal and multitudinous at any one time, leading to a 
consideration that one cannot forecast the context of a 
future decision on a person’s record of past decisions. 
In the context of this motivation, there is also the 
confusion between that which pleases us in the personal 
environment and that which we judge with our professio-
nal eyes (Faludi 1987). Faludi goes on to say that: 
In the comparative evaluation of consequences … 
following an act:  consequences may be anticipated or unanti-
cipated, and anticipated consequences may be either sought or 
unsought.  
 
The situation consists only of those objectives which have 
reliance in terms of the end-system of the organization, therefo-
re consequences …… only exist in relation to ends. 
 
In the research reported here, even where people had 
the requisite knowledge for taking a good decision, a signi-
ficant proportion geared those decisions to self-benefit 
while others talked of the dangers of having knowledge, 
ostensibly because the managers would get rid of the sub-
ordinate if they feared competition. Wallace et al. (1999) 
extend this argument (from research in IBM) noting the 
ambiguities in the extent to which people are oriented 
towards self-interest versus the orientation towards the 
interests of a wider group of which they are part, this being 
mediated by uncertainty avoidance i.e. the extent to which 
people seek to minimize uncertainty versus the extent to 
which they are tolerant of ambiguity.  
It is in this context that Fig. 3 is derived. Here the cros-
sed arrows at the top right shows a six by four set (matrix) of 
interactions all of which are likely to affect those emotions  
that will determine if there  will be  a reasoned  response,  or 
Case note 4 from Chinese factory S: 
A supervisor was told that an operator had acciden-
tally swallowed a quantity of acetone and emergency 
action was needed – should he make the operator 
vomit or not? As there were no local safety data 
sheets (SDS’s), these being stored on the computer 
network, a crowd of managers took about five minu-
tes to decide that the supervisor should look on the 
computer for the safety information.  It took ten mi-
nutes to get the correct program on line and then ano-
ther five to find the SDS, unfortunately it was only 
present in English which no one on the factory floor 
understood – the operator was pronounced dead. The 
perceptual reality of the managers was that manage-
ment had adequate control of dangerous chemicals; 
the empirical reality was somewhat different. 
Case note 3: The researcher facilitated a workshop on 
interactions and culture in Factory C in China: 
Several important things came out of this workshop:  First-
ly, all the managers said that this was the first time that 
they had actually got to know the interests of their collea-
gues and that this allowed them to understand people better 
and perhaps would enable them to work together better.  
Secondly, they were profoundly interested in various envi-
ronmental topics such as the geographical extent of their 
impact, including effluent to river and waste dispersal to 
some undetermined place. This emerged even though the 
















Fig. 3. Complexities in decision making (adapted from Perugini & Bagozzi 2001; Lindsay & Norman 1977) 
 
a tacit response leading to a tacitly actuated decision (see 
also Tyska 1986). In following path A, an indeterminate 
utility means that no reasoning has yet taken place as to 
the utility of any options from the preceding matrix and, 
even after reasoning, there may be vacillation occasioned 
by the company and personal attitudes to risk taking. Path 
B is the main option deployed in the subject factories as 
they all operate a punishment culture wherein risky deci-
sions are avoided. 
In this context, when the opportunity arises, deci-
sions can be passed on to the line manager. Path C indica-
tes a simple bypassing of reasoning in the decision 
process. This process can be so intricate that it is truly of 
significant complexity and is a prime example of where 
the bureaucratic Iron Cage of Weber (1904), deployed in 
all of the survey factories, fails to restrict  uncertainties in 
behaviors and outcomes in organizations as exemplified 




Hence, the decision process comprises a large, and 
largely indeterminate, number of variables going from an 
individual’s personal realities about many inter-related 
topics, through sets of choices dependent on temporal, 
locational and material risk options, to evasive behaviour 
i.e. avoiding or offsetting blame; and when the opportuni-




Organization structures and rule systems may, 
however, provide a stabilizing and integrating force 
(Frost et al. 1991; Burgess 1962) over and above their 
functional effectiveness. Cameron and Quinn (1999) re-
enforce this argument stating that co-ordination in a tur-
bulent environment is most effectively facilitated through 
the sharing of values, beliefs and goals. While the work 
environment for the research during these periods was 
one of rapid change, Craig (2001) established that more 
than one culture existed within the management hierarchy 
which led to significant differences between what top 
management desired and what happened at the worker-




Case note 7 – from a private conversation with a senior 
manager at Polish Factory M:   
“When the company was young (and small) some five years 
ago, it was comfortable and we all grew together and com-
munication was easy and people were relaxed; if I asked for 
a decision my boss would say ‘go away (and decide your-
self)’. Now competences and job boundaries are narrowly 
defined and it is hard to find out who is responsible for some 
things; in the old days people were trying to do their best, 
never saying ‘it is none of my business’. Due to the mixing 
(exchange) between the different factories the easy solving 
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Case note 5: Senior manager in a Polish factory 
This manager stepped outside his official job descrip-
tion by taking a decision outside his remit and saved the 
company 30,000 Zloty.  He was disciplined by the MD, 
had his salary frozen for the year and his six-month 
bonus cancelled. A prime example of the consequences 
of stepping outside the iron cage of beurocracy and the 
risk of taking decisions. 
 
He displays the notice from his MD declaring this pun-
ishment, framed, on his office wall. 
Case note 6: Polish factories 
In the research, all the managers and boards of directors in 
the Polish factories were newly appointed, parachuted from 
one factory to another and moved so often that they did not 
have the chance to determine the nature of the culture they 
were trying to communicate into. One parachutist Managing 
Director lamented his lack of understanding of the senior 
managers culture of lateral communication, while two of his 
senior managers expressed reservations about the MD’s 
ability to communicate vertically. Private conversations with 
all the top managers confirmed that they recognize this 
problem but do not know how to tackle it. It is likely to be a 
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7. Management hierarchies and social systems 
7.1. Structure and rule systems 
Every one of the factories had a hierarchical structure 
with its command and control rules and associated culture 
(Weber 1904 & 1948; Lounsberry and Carberry 2005; 
Neilson et al. 2005).  This is a little surprising to find in 
the mainland Chinese factories where the structures were 
enforced by Westernized management that might have 
pursued a more interactive and human-centric approach 
to man-management. This is partially contradicted by Fu 
et al. (2004) who states that Hong Kong based managers 
are more prone to pressurize, whereas mainland Chinese 
put more emphasis on persuasion. In the factories, where 
there are foreign Chinese Managing Directors and a 
mainland Chinese workforce, this dichotomy has not 
been fully resolved leading to complex interactions of 
perceived realities further separated by cultural differ-
ences (Chen et al. 2004).   
In all the study factories there has been no evidence 
of top management initiated culture, beyond that of 
command and obey.  This has been evidenced by a lack 
of direction and motivation amongst senior managers in 
Poland, while in China it appears restricted to a lack of 
direction. For instance, every factory has an environmen-
tal statement about how it is going to take care of the 
environment but the commitment is not fully translated 
into reality on the ground, effectively it can be classed as 
a façade to satisfy market-place opinion at minimum cost 
to production.   
This lack of a management initiated culture can be 
seen to foster further complexities (Sperber 1996) in fac-
tory operations which have led to contingent ambiguities 
in practical command and obey situations. However, 
Burgess (1962) puts a more subtle argument in that, tal-
king of societal process as organization, disorganization 
and re-organization (the equivalent of Archer’s thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis) he states that this gives a static 
community or social group but that this in turn encoura-
ges revolt against the status quo, this no doubt changing 
the organizational dynamics. 
Technical and meaningful communication with emp-
loyees in all the factories had been observed as poor over 
many years prior to the commencement of the research, 
with the possible exception of orders collectively agreed 
as imperative. However, the general management percep-
tions on the quality of environmental systems are that 
communication is good, whereas the ISO14001 audits 
have highlighted significant failures in management 
communication and the consequential decisions and out-
comes due, in may cases, to the phenomena mentioned in 
case note 6. It indicates that senior and top management 
are not cognizant of what is really happening in the orga-
nization; a feature that is covered by Neilson et al. (2005) 
for passive-aggressive organizations. 
Hence the management hierarchies have failed to 
control the rather complex socio-cultural groupings 
which are formed, and change temporally, dependent 
upon changes in the organizational environment and bu-
reaucracies (see also Stacey 1992). The combination of a 
fear and punishment top-management ethos, education, 
language, social class and person-centric realities institute 
further complexities by the seemingly unintended 
consequence of causing rigid job boundary demarcations 
(see Case Note 7). 
 
7.2. Job boundaries 
It could be argued that the Polish workforce is better and 
more broadly trained and more likely to interpret com-
mands in an innovative and constructive way ‘we know 
better what this line can do’, than their Chinese counter-
parts – but read case note 7 which shows an example of 
what can go wrong. The Chinese, however, have the ad-
vantage of carrying no old technology practice or baggage. 
Taylor (1911) suggests that the worker has the skills and 
management must use these, but the impediments in China 
appear to be the barriers of socio-cultural discontinuity, 
e.g. language barriers to effective communication (due to 
national and industrial cultural differences between coun-
tries) occurring at management boundaries alongside less 
broadly based skills in production.  
In the context of hierarchies, covert and overt beha-
viour are both deployed in the self-restriction of control 
(boundaries) in order to avoid responsibility. In two Chi-
nese factories this had happened to such an extent that the 
top managers could not see a solution to overcoming 
agency, where people turn ideas into action and tend to 
dominate in operational areas such as the measurement of 
system or product parameters.   
This aspect of the elision of management messages 
through incoherent cultures where the agency becomes 
free to create and draw on their own social culture, po-
ssibly differs by geographical location due to historical, 
industrial and locally-specific social pressures. 
 
8. Core peer groups 
Core peer groups subscribe to the ethos of a given sub-
group in an organization, characterized in Frost et al. 
(1991) as an integrated group and exemplified from the 
research data diagram in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Integrated perceptions (a single core group) 
 
They are also, more fully, defined in the Merton 
(1967) proposals for reference groups and, from Fig. 5, 
reference individuals. The designations on the ordinates 
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question about communication in the factory, most peop-
le rated performance between 8 to 10; this indicates 
strong agreement that communication is good and is clas-
sed as an ‘integrated’ response. In fact, for environmental 
matters it was benchmarked as poor. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Fragmented perceptions (no core group) 
 
In Fig. 5, where the question related to the costs of 
environmental protection being below 10% of profits, the 
scores are spread across the abscissa and totally fragmen-
ted. This demonstrates that the communication origina-
ting (or not) from top management is poor. 
Within most organizations there are managers who 
drift out of such (peer) groups to form a fringe population 
with no identifiable core group, Frost (1991) calls this a 
fragmented organization as exemplified in Fig. 5. The 
situation may also be rather more complex as there may 
be managers who subscribe in principle to core groups 
but who adopt different values (Alvesson 2002) depen-
dent on beliefs which govern the behaviour for decision 
actions. These people root their decisions in subjectively 
derived cognitive models, which diverge among indivi-
duals (Heugens 2005) as in Fig. 5.  
Craig and Lemon (2004, 2005) highlight how the 
distribution of these virtual groups or fragments were 
determined by establishing the perceptions of all the ma-
nagers (203) in the study factories and plotting their 
strength of feeling responses to a twenty-item 
questionnaire based on environmental and production 
aspects. From this data it was possible to determine how 
distant their perceptions were from empirical reality. It is 
proposed that the phenomena which cause the gaps 
between empirical and perceptive realities are directly 




There was little difference between the Chinese and East 
European factories in the extent of fragmented responses 
although the patterns of these responses were nearly all 
different. This appears to confirm that people are com-
plex and different one from another even if they subscribe 
individually, or perhaps unknowingly, to a framework or 
core peer group, the modes of conduct of which they may 
not always follow (Shibutani 1962).  
Inherently, managers in a chain of command are in-
volved in inter-actional role setting, but an individual in 
the chain can choose from an infinite number of role 
definitions with an infinite number of related job bounda-
ries, but will need a re-definition if another manager’s 
role changes (see also Turner 1962). An interesting facet 
in this context was the parachuting of new top managers, 
virtually overnight, into all of the Polish and some of the 
Chinese factories.  
These new managers were unable to understand im-
mediately, and sometimes long-term, what their inter-
actional roles were, with the consequence that they could 
neither understand nor comprehend, at all, the pervading 
culture which they were sent to change, and were therefo-
re at a significant disadvantage and at a severe risk of 
being parachuted out quite quickly (see also case note 6).  
As discussed in individual sections above, there is a mul-
titude of complexities within which are topics that have 
been the subject of argument since the days of Sun Zi 
(circa 512BC) and Machiavelli (1506AD), and the possi-
bility of new managers providing effective solutions to 
management and production problems, when incognizant 
of the factory culture, is rather remote. 
One message from the survey and study is abundant-
ly clear, each factory comprises different people with 
different perceptions, beliefs and values, and these diffe-
rent perceptions create framework groups which govern 
individual and factory behaviour and performance which 




Inter alia, the topics of empirical and perceived realities, 
socio-cultural and communication complexities have 
been discussed and the contingent complexities high-
lighted and these have been summarized within a practi-
cal factory context in the discussion above. 
The use of the management framework models of 
Archer (1996) and Frost (1991) proved satisfactory in 
facilitating a discussion of the complexity surrounding 
why these do and do not work, as well as amply illustra-
ting some of the problems of coherent management. 
In the surveyed organizations it was established that 
the fragmented and variable operational cultures and sub-
cultures interfered with the efficient management of those 
organizations dependent upon multiple variables occasio-
ned by multiple and incoherent perspectives (of individu-
als) which were mostly a long way from empirical reality. 
A significant mismatch was observed between what 
top management intended to happen in organization cont-
rol and what actually materialized, this arising from diffe-
rent degrees of complexities on a topic, the subsequent 
uncertainty, and the ambiguity surrounding decisions on 
the environment. 
It is concluded that, from the virtually infinite nu-
mber of variables constituting successive options for 
differences, that there is both an unbounded rationality 
and an unbounded complexity to human affairs in organi-
zations that even a Weberian iron cage bureaucracy 
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APLINKOS APSAUGOS VEIKSMINGUMO SUVOKIMO IR EMPIRINĖS REALYBĖS NEATITIKTIS: 
KINIJOS, LIETUVOS IR LENKIJOS ĮMONIŲ PAVYZDŽIAI 
J. H. S. Craig, M. Lemon 
S a n t r a u k a  
Įmonės kultūra dažnai siejama su įmonės ekonominiu ir aplinkosauginiu veiksmingumu. Tai veda prie bendrų valdymo 
principų plėtojimo ir taikymo, tačiau šie principai nepakankamai įvertina organizacijoje egzistuojančias daugialypes kultū-
ras arba galimą atskirtį tarp darbuotojų suvokiamo aplinkosauginio veiksmingumo ir bandymų jį „objektyviai“ išmatuoti. 
Straipsnyje pateiktas tyrimas susijęs su įsivaizduojamų ir objektyvių aplinkosauginio veiksmingumo priemonių paly-
ginimu trylikoje Kinijos ir Rytų Europos sunkiosios pramonės įmonių. Rezultatai įrodė, kad ir horizontalusis, ir vertikalu-
sis vadovavimo principas yra veikiami socialinių-kultūrinių ryšių šeimose, bendruomenėse ir darbo aplinkoje, todėl 
neišvengiamai lemia sudėtingumą lyginant suvokiamą ir objektyvią aplinkos apsaugos realybę. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: sudėtingumas, kultūra, realybė, kalba, hierarchija. 
 
ПОНИМАНИЕ ПРИРОДООХРАННОЙ ДЕЙСТВЕННОСТИ И СЛОЖНОСТЬ ЭМПИРИЧЕСКОЙ 
РЕАЛЬНОСТИ НА ПРИМЕРЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЙ ИЗ КИТАЯ, ЛИТВЫ И ПОЛЬШИ 
Д. Г. С. Крэйг, М. Лемон 
Р е з ю м е 
Культура предприятия зачастую оценивается на основании экономической и природоохранной действенности 
предприятия. Это способствует развитию и приспособлению общих принципов управления, однако эти принципы 
в недостаточной степени оценивают многогранную культуру, царящую в организации. Можно различить пони-
маемую работниками природоохранную действенность и попытки объективно ее измерить. Представленное в 
статье исследование направлено на сравнение своеобразно понимаемых и объективных природоохранных мер на 
тринадцати предприятиях тяжелой промышленности в Китае и Восточной Европе. Результаты показали, что как 
горизонтальный, так и вертикальный принципы руководства действенны в семьях, обществах и рабочей среде с 
социально-культурными связями, поэтому обусловлены сложностями, оказывающими воздействие на объектив-
ную природоохранную реальность.  
Ключевые слова: сложность, культура, реальность, язык, иерархия.  
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